In short, Plohky claims that Putin's success on today's battlefield would not restore Russia to its former self; rather, it would create a new entity – a Ukraine once again subservient to the Federation of Russia. I've wanted to read Serhii Plokhy's history of Ukraine, 'The Gates of Europe', for a while now. But when I discovered that he has written a book about the current war in Ukraine, I decided to read that first. The Russo-Ukrainian war, Plokhy argues, marks the end of the unipolar world that had come into being after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Putin had hoped for multipolarity, with several great powers asserting their spheres of influence. However, what the historian sees emerging instead is a new confrontation between East and West.

A child on an evacuation train in Pokrovsk in eastern Ukraine, November 2022. Photograph: Anatolii Stepanov/AFP/Getty ImagesMearsheimers advies werd niet opgevolgd. In plaats daarvan zette de Clinton-regering Kiev onder druk om de in Oekraïne aanwezige kernwapens aan Rusland af te staan. Na lang wikken en wegen gaf Oekraïne zijn kernwapens inderdaad op, in ruil voor de belofte van de permanente leden van de VN-Veiligheidsraad (met inbegrip van Rusland) om de Oekraïense soevereiniteit te eerbiedigen — vastgelegd in het Boedapest-memorandum van 1994. In aanvulling hierop tekenden Jeltsin en Kuchma in 1997 een ‘vriendschapsverdrag’ om het probleem van de Russische Zwarte Zee-vloot op de Krim voorlopig te regelen. Ondanks het Boedapest-memorandum en het ‘vriendschapsverdrag’, kon Oekraïne zich nooit volledig veilig wanen voor Russische geopolitieke ambities (te meer niet omdat het ‘vriendschapsverdrag’ strandde in de Russische Doema). Oekraïne zocht daarom, in navolging van Polen en Tsjechië, voor zijn veiligheid in toenemende mate toenadering tot de Navo.

Over a year into Russia’s grotesque full-scale invasion of Ukraine, disinformation and misconceptions of the conflict — fuelled both by the Kremlin and by political actors abroad — continue to permeate public debate. "The Russo-Ukrainian War: The Return of History" by Serhii Plokhy takes aim at many of these myths, demonstrating how Russia’s centuries-long imperial obsession with Ukraine created the conditions for Europe’s largest land war since 1945. This book is in two halves, before 22 February 2022 and after. I needed the first part (but not the second) because after all the millions of words spouted forth by the journalists and professors, still my brain could not quite grasp exactly why Putin decided to roll his tanks. This was not an amicable division: collateral succession was the norm at that time, with property passing to a single heir, typically the eldest son. Yoropolk, the eldest, objected to Vladimir's grant and in 977AD the "Great Feudal War of Succession" began. Vladimir won and in 980AD he became Grand Prince of both Novgorod as well as Grand Prince of Kiev. In 988AD the pagan Vladimir was baptized into the Eastern Orthodox Church centered in Constantinople. At the time of Ukrainian entry to the USSR, Crimea was included in the Ukraine SSR, leading one to think that Crimea would share Ukraine's status after the 1992 referendum on independence. That was the case – until Putin's 2014 annexation of Crimea by force. Whatever happens, historians will draw on this book when assessing the history of this war. Alongside journalists such as Anna Arutunyan, Luke Harding and Owen Matthews, Plokhy has provided an invaluable first draft of a history of this war.Den andra halvan beskriver bara övergripande hur kriget har utkämpats fram till manusslutet i februari. Hans fokus är här fortfarande den politiska och ekonomiska sidan snarare än den militära. Även här är det välskrivet och informativt. Om det är något som saknas är det möjligen att han inte förklarar den enorma påverkan som de ortodoxa kyrkorna och deras strider haft som bidragit på olika sätt till konflikten. The book focu Tegen deze achtergrond bestond er vanaf het einde van de Koude Oorlog eigenlijk voortdurend onzekerheid over de vraag of Rusland de territoriale integriteit van Oekraïne zou blijven respecteren. Al in 1992 nam het Russische parlement een resolutie aan die de Krim als onderdeel van Rusland beschouwde. Duidelijk is dat Oekraïense soevereiniteit slechts was gegarandeerd zolang het land zich schikte naar de belangen van Rusland, of zoals Plokhy schrijft: “Russia’s recognition of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the post-Soviet states would be conditional on alliance with Moscow.” (66) Onder deze omstandigheden, zo bepleitte John Mearsheimer in 1993 in Foreign Affairs, zouden de VS er goed aan doen Oekraïne toe te staan te blijven beschikken over kernwapens; volgens de Amerikaanse strateeg was dit “the most effective way to prevent a Russo-Ukrainian war [which could] ‘injure the prospects for peace throughout Europe.’” (71-2)

P.S. Vă las și un citat despre o vizită la Kiev. Sunt curioasă dacă observați ce personaj este pierdut din poveste. Și nu cred că din răutate:(In 1259AD, after a Mongolian civil war, the Mongol Empire broke up into eight Khanates, each representing a different area of control. The area of modern Ukraine became part of the Crimean Khanate and it remained under Mongol control until Ivan the Great drove the Mongols out of "All Rus'" in 1480. Serhii Plokhy has been an essential part of my personal education on the long proud history of a brave and undaunted nation. The Crimean peninsula is an island with one narrow land bridge to Ukraine. It long served as a major locus for export or import of good between Eastern Europe and the Ottoman Turks at Constantinople, and on to the Mediterranean Sea through the Bosporus. His chapter contrasting Ukraine and Russia’s different trajectories is fascinating. After a semi-democratic interlude under Boris Yeltsin, Moscow reverted to autocracy. Ukraine, by contrast, managed to preserve a competitive presidential-parliamentary system. Regional differences helped. Pro-reform nationalists in the west of the country had to find compromises with Moscow-leaning communists in the east. His chapter contrasting Ukraine and Russia’s different trajectories is fascinating

In Chapter One, Plokhylays out his central contention: that the “myth of Russia’s Kyivan origins had already embedded itself in the consciousness of the Russian elites by the late fifteenth century.” The centrality of Ukraine to Russia’s idea of itself, he writes, contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union: “The role of Ukraine in bringing about the Soviet collapse can hardly be exaggerated. Not only was it a key political actor pushing for Imperial Collapse the dissolution of the USSR, but it also helped to ensure a peaceful disintegration.” An authoritative history of Europe’s largest military conflict since World War II, from the New York Times best-selling author of The Gates of Europe.

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Nach Gorbatschow musste sich die Sowjetunion neu ordnen, oder das, was von ihr übrig war. „Im November 1988 erklärte Estland als erste Sowjetrepublk seine Souveränität.“ 1991 stimmte die Mehrheit der Ukrainer für die Unabhängigkeit. Selbst in Russlands Herzen gab es Bestrebungen nach mehr Demokratie, bevor Jelzin 1993 sein eigenes Parlament unter Beschuss nehmen ließ. In Russland geht es nie ohne Gewalt ab. Und Moskau will nicht begreifen oder einsehen, dass niemand freiwillig auf seinem Schoß sitzt. Wen es nicht mit Waffengewalt in Schach hält, der läuft davon und das so schnell wie möglich. It is a cruel game to ask a historian to look into the future. But here we are and, as Plokhy himself says, rephrasing Churchill, historians are probably “the worst commentators on contemporary events except for all the others”. So what about the Ukrainians’ spring counteroffensive, I ask – which, when we speak in the last days of April, is expected any day. The invasion, and its accompanying atrocities, have made any simplistic Elon Musk-style “Crimea for Donbas” deal impossible for years to come. Anything can happen now: a sudden victory for Ukraine, a long and bitter stalemate, the overthrow of Putin, all-out nuclear war. This impressive and valuable book can’t tell us which. But it is a clear, reliable and (in the circumstances) remarkably calm account of how we got here. When Russia illegally annexed Crimea in 2014 and helped unleash a proxy war in Donbas in the east of the country, Ukraine had to face its aggressive neighbour alone. Plokhy’s account of both the annexation of Crimea and the mobilisation of separatists in Donbas eschews shades of grey. Intelligence failure’ of ‘error of judgment’? Of allebei? Poetin had in ieder geval beter kunnen weten als hij had geluisterd naar kolonel-generaal b.d. Leonid Ivashov, die hem als voorzitter van de Russische officieren vereniging in januari 2021, enkele weken vóór de inval, een open brief schreef: “The use of military force against Ukraine will, in the first place, put into question the existence of Russia itself as a state. Secondly, it will make Russians and Ukrainians mortal enemies for ever. Thirdly, thousands (tens of thousands) of healthy young men will perish on both sides, and that will unquestionably affect the future demographic situation in our countries, which are dying out.” (149)