The Eastern Fleet and the Indian Ocean, 1942-1944: The Fleet that Had to Hide

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Another strange thing is that a lot of Admiral Somerville’s comments to the on-going situation are taken from his letters to his wife. Why would an admiral discuss tactical and operational naval issues with his wife? Maybe she had a great interest in these issues and also detailed knowledge of naval ships and tactics or the admiral only wrote to “ventilate” his feelings. Perrett, Bryan (2014). Why the Japanese lost. Barnsley, UK: Pen & Sword Military. p.114. ISBN 978-1-78159-198-7. A well written and absorbing account of the role played by this important but neglected force. Centre for Maritime Historical Studies, University of Exeter I put off buying this book for quite a long time - probably because I found the sub-title a bit corny - but I read a good review of it, and took the plunge, because it is a subject I don't know too much about. Roskill, Stephen (1956). War at Sea 1939-1945, Volume II, the Period of Balance. United Kingdom Military Series. London: HMSO . Retrieved 2 September 2015.

After the war, the Fleet was once again based at the Naval Base at Singapore. It took part in the Malayan Emergency and the Confrontation with Indonesia in the 1960s. By 1964 the fleet on station included HMS Victorious, Centaur, Bulwark, Kent, Hampshire, seventeen destroyers and frigates, (some drawn from the Mediterranean), about ten minesweepers and five submarines. [20] In June, the IJA developed a plan for a major offensive in the Indian Ocean, including an invasion of Ceylon. The Germans were advancing in North Africa, which made an Axis link-up in the Middle East attractive. Resource constraints forced the IJN to reject it, especially once the Guadalcanal Campaign started. [56]

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L, Klemen (1999–2000). "Allied Merchant Ship Losses in the Pacific and Southeast Asia". Forgotten Campaign: The Dutch East Indies Campaign 1941–1942.

The Japanese air search on the morning of 9 April was limited as on 5 April, as British carriers were no longer expected. [8] I particularly enjoy reading about British Commonwealth naval contributions (Australia, NZ, South Africa) even though their ships were few in number. French, Dutch, and Italian efforts in support was an added plus. If you are looking for wide ranging (Leyte) or game changing action (Midway) then this not the book. For a niche filling effort then I highly recommend Stephenson' contribution. Until the Second World War, the Indian Ocean had been a British "lake". It was ringed by significant British and Commonwealth possessions and much of the strategic supplies needed in peace and war had to pass across it: i.e. Persian oil, Malayan rubber, Indian tea, Australian and New Zealand foodstuffs. Britain also utilised Australian and New Zealand manpower; hence, safe passage for British cargo ships was critical. [3] Houterman, J.N. "Royal Navy (RN) Officers 1939–1945 – B". unithistories.com. Houterman and Kloppes . Retrieved 22 July 2018.

Summary

Shortly after 06:00 [29] Nagumo's force began launching 91 bombers and 36 fighters for the strike on Colombo. [19] British early warning failed to detect and identify the incoming strike, [30] forcing British pilots to scramble under fire when the first Japanese aircraft appeared over them at 07:45. The effective defence of the Ratmalana airbase by British fighters [31] left the harbour exposed. The armed merchant cruiser HMS Hector, [32] the Norwegian tanker Soli [33] and the old destroyer HMS Tenedos were sunk; three other ships were damaged. The port was damaged [32] but was not put out of action. [19] 20 of the 41 British fighters that took off were destroyed. [16] At least one fighter was damaged and made incapable of flight while attempting to take off. The six Swordfish of 788 NAS arrived during the battle and were shot down. [25] The Japanese lost seven aircraft. [16] Worse, the sighting report did not describe the enemy force’s strength. But Somerville correctly guessed the intruders were Nagumo’s carriers coming up from south of Java and not a full-scale amphibious assault force. Privately, Churchill was angry and complained to the Admiralty, “No satisfactory explanation has ever been given by the officer concerned [Somerville] of the imprudent dispersion of his forces in the early days of April.”

Providing a worthwhile narrative on a less well-known subject, this book serves as a reminder that, even during a global conflict, kinetic action remains only a part of what navies ask warships to do. The NYMAS Review Two new fighting forces were officially formed in November 1944 to operate against the Japanese in the Pacific and Indian oceans; a restructured Eastern Fleet was Commodore (D), Commanding, Destroyer Flotillas, Eastern Fleet (and later East Indies Fleet) [ edit ] The Japanese inflicted disproportionate damage on the enemy. They damaged port facilities, sank one carrier and two cruisers, destroyed a third of enemy ground-based fighters and nearly all of the enemy ground-based strike aircraft. In addition, 23 merchant ships, [41] totalling 112,312 tons, [43] were sunk, including those by the separate Japanese Malay Force. In return, the Japanese lost only 18 aircraft, with damage to about 31 more. Conversely, they failed to destroy, or even locate, the main bulk of the British Eastern Fleet. [41] Until 1941, the main threat to British interests in the region was the presence of German commerce raiders ( auxiliary cruisers) and submarines. The fleet had trade protection as its first priority and was required to escort convoys and eliminate the raiders. The Germans had converted merchant ships to act as commerce raiders and allocated supply ships to maintain them. The location and destruction of these German raiders consumed much British naval effort until the last raider – Michel – was sunk in October 1943. [6]When Fuchida reported on the victory to Nagumo, the dour old admiral swelled with pride. But the surrounding surface line officers were discomfited, almost angry. They did not like the idea of the naval air arm being so powerful. The First Air Fleet had just sunk two powerful men-of-war in motion, not trapped and immobile like the ships in Pearl Harbor. The advocates of surface ship supremacy had no alibi left. Fuchida said, “Sea power had changed and a new era had begun. This was the victory of naval air power.” The Eastern Fleet that Vice Admiral Sir James Somerville assumed command of in March 1942 was smaller than what had been envisioned in December 1941. Somerville divided the fleet into two groups, based on speed. The faster "Force A" included the aircraft carriers HMS Formidable and HMS Indomitable, the modernized battleship HMS Warspite (as flagship), as well as the modern cruisers and destroyers. The slower "Force B" was formed around the old carrier HMS Hermes and four unmodernized Revenge-class battleships. A few submarines were also available. [13] [10] [14] [15] The ships had never operated together before, and both ship and air crews were deficient in training. [13] The story of the British Eastern Fleet, which operated in the Indian Ocean against Japan, has rarely been told. Although it was the largest fleet deployed by the Royal Navy prior to 1945 and played a vital part in the theatre it was sent to protect, it has no place in the popular consciousness of the naval history of the Second World War. So Charles Stephenson’s deeply researched and absorbing narrative gives this forgotten fleet the recognition it deserves. However I am going to go on a tangent here and contradict that point of view, there are no really good books (that I have found) about the Hawker Tempest V that beat reading pilots notes or performance data found online. While every book on the Spitfire regurgitates the same old dreary narrative. Id like more objectivity and analysis in military books but I think the vast majority of readers wouldnt..

Actually, the Japanese had not. Nagumo was circling to the east of Ceylon, a clear 500 miles away, figuring out his next move. Shores, Christopher; Cull, Brian & Izawa, Yasuho (2002). Bloody Shambles, Volume One: The Drift to War to the Fall of Singapore. Grub Street. The Japanese missed an opportunity to find Force A after sinking the cruisers. The aircraft shadowing the cruisers flew another 50 miles (80km) along the cruisers' course before returning to Tone. It would have detected Force A if it had flown southwest another ten minutes. [34] The invasion scare was short-lived. British intelligence detected the movement of the Japanese carrier force eastward in mid-April, and their deployment in the Pacific in mid-May. [55] After the Battle of Midway in June, it was realized that there was no longer the threat of major Japanese naval activity in the Indian Ocean. In September, British intelligence predicted Japan would go over to the defensive. As a result, the Eastern Fleet was not reinforced as planned and, instead, shrank after early July. [56] Japanese reaction [ edit ] In May 1942, the Eastern Fleet supported the invasion of Madagascar, Operation Ironclad. It was aimed at thwarting any attempt by Japanese vessels to use naval bases on the Vichy French controlled territory. During the invasion, vessels of the Eastern Fleet were confronted by vessels of the French Navy and submarines of the Imperial Japanese Navy. [16] Indian Ocean strikes [ ]

A rather lot of the book is also focusing on various debates between admirals and other war commanders as well with the political level and of course Winston Churchill. It is surprising how negative picture of Churchill is presented by the opinions of admirals and generals of the British forces. If this picture, as presented through the lens of the Indian Ocean would be the view from all major officers and all theatres of operations, it is hard to see how Winston Churchill could get anything done at all. At 11:30 am on the 5th, lookouts on Dorsetshire spotted a seaplane from the Japanese cruiser Tone hovering watchfully on the eastern horizon. Agar maintained radio silence until noon, then reported he was being shadowed. The message never got to Colombo or to Somerville. Tully, Anthony; Yu, Lu (2015). "A Question of Estimates: How Faulty Intelligence Drove Scouting at the Battle of Midway". Naval War College Review. United States Naval War College. 68 (2) . Retrieved 8 September 2020.