The Ancient Greeks at War

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The Ancient Greeks at War

The Ancient Greeks at War

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Pritchard, David M. (2010). War, Democracy, and Culture in Classical Athens. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Some societies use Oxford Academic personal accounts to provide access to their members. See below. Even more important, it is in the conclusion that Rawlings most explicitly situates his overall approach within the two different grand schemes of the development of Greek warfare that have dominated scholarship of the last few decades. Rather than accepting the view, popular since the late 1980s, that posits a breakdown of the 'hoplite contest' in the 5th century, Rawlings is sceptical that there every were anything but practical limits on the intensity of Greek warfare: '[The Greeks] were limited only by their capacity to organize themselves ... From Agamemnon to Alexander, the evidence suggests that at no time were the Greeks ever constrained by a sense of agonism to conduct their wars in a fair and sportsmanlike fashion' (p. 226). To explain the increased intensity of warfare in the classical period, Rawlings follows the work of Hans van Wees and emphasises the crucial role of social organisation, in particular the growth of the state (pp. 224-5).

Syllabus

One major reason for Phillip's success in conquering Greece was the break with Hellenic military traditions that he made. With more resources available, he was able to assemble a more diverse army, including strong cavalry components. He took the development of the phalanx to its logical completion, arming his 'phalangites' (for they were assuredly not hoplites) with a fearsome 6m (20ft) pike, the ' sarissa'. Much more lightly armored, the Macedonian phalanx was not so much a shield-wall as a spear-wall. The Macedonian phalanx was a supreme defensive formation, but was not intended to be decisive offensively; instead, it was used to pin down the enemy infantry, whilst more mobile forces (such as cavalry) outflanked them. This ' combined arms' approach was furthered by the extensive use of skirmishers, such as peltasts. In 330 the Emperor Constantine the Great changed the capital of the Roman Empire from Rome to Constantinople. Greek population was part of the Empire and the Eastern part of the Roman Empire was already heavily Hellenized and Emperor Heraclius completed the Hellenization (replaced Latin with Greek as the official language, etc.) of the Byzantine Empire. However, from the very beginning, it was clear that the Spartan hegemony was shaky; the Athenians, despite their crushing defeat, restored their democracy but just one year later, ejecting the Sparta-approved oligarchy. The Spartans did not feel strong enough to impose their will on a shattered Athens. Undoubtedly part of the reason for the weakness of the hegemony was a decline in the Spartan population. Rawlings, Louis (2007). The Ancient Greeks at War. Manchester University Press. ISBN 978 0 7190 56574.

Greek armies also included significant numbers of light infantry, the Psiloi, as support troops for the heavy hoplites, who also doubled as baggage handlers for the heavy foot. These included javelin throwers ( akontistai), stone throwers ( lithovoloi and petrovoloi) and slingers ( sfendonitai) while archers ( toxotai) were rare, mainly from Crete, or mercenary non-Greek tribes (as at the crucial battle of Plataea 479 B.C.) Greek armies gradually downgraded the armor of the hoplites (to linen padded thorax and open helmets) to make the phalanx more flexible and upgraded the javelineers to lightly armored general purpose infantry ( thorakitai and thyreophoroi) with javelins and sometimes spears. Eventually, these types effectively complemented the Macedonian style phalanx which prevailed throughout Greece after Alexander the Great. Operations started in the 20th century but continuing into the 21st century are listed in both centuries. At least in the Archaic Period, the fragmentary nature of Ancient Greece, with many competing city-states, increased the frequency of conflict, but conversely limited the scale of warfare. Unable to maintain professional armies, the city-states relied on their citizens to fight. This inevitably reduced the potential duration of campaigns, as citizens would need to return to their jobs (especially in the case of farmers). Campaigns would therefore often be restricted to summer. Armies marched directly to their target, possibly agreed on by the protagonists. Sparta was an exception to this rule, as every Spartiate was a professional soldier. Spartans instead relied on slaves called helots for civilian jobs such as farming. Rich, John and Shipley, Graham. eds. (1993). War and Society in the Greek World. London: Routledge. Van der Heyden, A. A. M. and Scullard, H. H., (eds.), Atlas of the Classical World, London: Nelson, 1959.Bridges, Emma et al. eds. (2007). Cultural Responses to the Persian Wars: Antiquity to the Third Millennium. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Anderson, J.K. 1969. Review of Greek Oared Ships 900-322 B.C. by J. S. Morrison. Classical Philology 64: 180-183. Medieval Greece [ edit ] Byzantine Period, Byzantine Greek successor states of the Byzantine Empire ( Empire of Trebizond, Despotate of Epirus, Despotate of the Morea, Empire of Nicaea, Empire of Thessalonica, Principality of Theodoro) and Frankokratia [ edit ] In 'Early Greek warfare' Rawlings turns to the conduct of war, the topic of the rest of the book. He discusses the scanty evidence for the nature of Bronze-Age warfare and highlights the symbolic functions of chariots, walls, and even swords (pp. 21-3). He then turns to Homer's depiction of war, which, following Hans van Wees, he takes to be largely contemporary and coherent, rather than an amalgam of practices from different time periods (pp. 36-7). (1) He also endorses van Wees's position that the fighting in Homer was 'a more fluid and realistic affair than many commentators have realized' (p. 37). Kagan, Donald (1981). The Peace of Nicias and the Sicilian expedition. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Syllabus Assessment Assessment Summative

Opposition to it throughout the period 369–362 BC caused numerous clashes. In an attempt to bolster the Thebans' position, Epaminondas again marched on the Pelopennese in 362 BC. At the Battle of Mantinea, the largest battle ever fought between the Greek city-states occurred; most states were represented on one side or the other. Epaminondas deployed tactics similar to those at Leuctra, and again the Thebans, positioned on the left, routed the Spartans, and thereby won the battle. However, such were the losses of Theban manpower, including Epaminondas himself, that Thebes was thereafter unable to sustain its hegemony. Conversely, another defeat and loss of prestige meant that Sparta was unable to regain its primary position in Greece. Ultimately, Mantinea, and the preceding decade, severely weakened many Greek states, and left them divided and without the leadership of a dominant power. Hanson, Victor Davis (2000). The Western Way of War: Infantry Battle in Classical Greece. University of California Press. ISBN 0-520-21911-2. Following the eventual defeat of the Athenians in 404 BC, and the disbandment of the Athenian-dominated Delian League, Ancient Greece fell under the hegemony of Sparta. The peace treaty which ended the Peloponnesian War left Sparta as the de facto ruler of Greece ( hegemon). Although the Spartans did not attempt to rule all of Greece directly, they prevented alliances of other Greek cities, and forced the city-states to accept governments deemed suitable by Sparta.Important rituals had to be performed following victory which included the recovering of the dead and the setting up of a victory trophy (from tropaion, meaning turning point in the conflict) at the exact place on the battlefield where victory became assured. The trophy could be in the form of captured weapons and armour or an image of Zeus; on occasion memorials to the fallen were also set up. Speeches, festivals, sacrifices and even games could also be held following a victory in the field. Conclusion



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